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RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, by Elizabeth S. Scott &
Laurence Steinberg1
GLENN M. STUART 2
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM'S RESPONSE to harmful youth
misconduct has been characterized by a tension between a focus on the rehabili-
tation of youths and a desire to enforce public safety through punitive measures.
To this day, th debate continues in both Canada and the United States. In
Rethinking Juvenile Justice, Elizabeth S. Scott and Laurence Steinberg have
brought together their interdisciplinary perspectives to develop a thorough ra-
tionale for the structure of a youth criminal justice system. An analysis that is
drawn from the distinctive American experience is relevant to Canadians as we
assess the continuing criticism (from some quarters) of the current approach to
youth justice in this country.
The authors start from the premise that the legal framework for youth
justice in the United States' has developed without a thorough and principled
analysis of the elements necessary for an. effective system. Thus, the rehabilita-
tive model, based in the well-established notion of ensuring child welfare, fo-
cused exclusively on the rehabilitation of youths at the expense of procedural
safeguards. Youths4 were deemed to be children, lacking the cognitive capacity
1. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008) 370 pages.
2. B.A., University of Toronto; LL.B., Queen's University; Member of the Law Society of
Upper Canada.
3. It is important for the Canadian reader to bear in mind that criminal law, and youth criminal
law, in the United States is a matter of state jurisdiction. This means that Scott and Steinberg's
analysis is confined to looking at trends among (sometimes) divergent state laws, and does
not focus on a single legal model, as in Canada, where the system falls to federal jurisdiction.
4. In this review, the terms "youth" and "youths" will be used to refer to persons under the legal
age of adulthood (typically eighteen); adolescents will refer to youths between the ages of
twelve and eighteen.
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to be held accountable for their misdeeds. As the authors discuss, this approach,
without either effective rehabilitation or any consequences for youths, failed to
effectively respond to youth crime. With high-profile incidents of youth violence
increasing in the 1990s, public pressure seemed to grow for a reactionary over-
haul of the system.' Scott and Steinberg therefore review the "moral panic"6 that
triggered the disjointed collection of measures in the United States that threw
youths into the adult justice system7 (notwithstanding these same youths being
treated as children in other aspects of the law).8 This punitive-based approach
shifted large numbers of youths from the youth courts to the criminal courts and
caused an escalation of the sentences imposed on youths, an extension of the
crimes for which youths could be treated as adults, and an increase in the number
of youths being incarcerated in adult facilities. After reviewing both extremes of
rehabilitation and punishment, the authors conclude that neither system properly
serves the ends of youth justice. Consequently, they set out to build a principled
foundation for an alternative system.
Scott and Steinberg distill a wealth of scientific research9 into a few key
premises about the distinctive nature of adolescence-as a stage of development
that is neither childhood nor adulthood-that provide a principled foundation
for the model they propose. Significant attention is spent exploring the basis
of those unique features that distinguish adolescents from both children and
adults.1 ° The authors propose three concepts of particular note derived from the
research on youth development: adolescents' choices are shaped by inherently
immature judgment, which leads to increased propensity for criminal conduct
and reduced culpability for that conduct; normal adolescents may become in-
5. This trend, which the authors observed in the United States, was also apparent in Canada
and sparked pressure for the reform of the Young Offenders Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1 [YOA].
Nicholas Bala provides a discussion of its history, which culminated in the introduction of
the Youth CriminalJusticeAct, S.C. 2002, c. 1 [YCJA]. See Nicholas Bala, "The
Development of Canada's Youth Justice Law" in Kathryn Campbell, ed., Understanding
Youth Justice in Canada (Toronto: Pearson Education Canada, 2005) 41 at 43-50.
6. Scott & Steinberg, supra note I at 9-11.
7. Ibid. at 102-17.
8. Ibid. at 100-01.
9. It is notable that much of the developmental research that the authors rely on has only been
undertaken since the shift to a more punitive model of youth justice occurred. Ibid. at 13.
10. These features, as derived from behavioural science studies, are detailed by Scott and
Steinberg. Ibid., c. 2, 28.
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volved in criminal behavior, but will mature out of it and grow to be law-abiding
adults; and the salience of social context to development means that the structure
of correctional environments will determine whether youths will become respon-
sible adults. 1
Scott and Steinberg apply their learning about youth development to a legal
model that strikes a balance between the historical extremes discussed above.
Their model stresses the rehabilitation of youths, including an emphasis on the
need for investment in systems that support positive development before criminal
behaviour arises. The premise is that if most adolescent delinquents are not des-
tined to be life-long criminals, the system must not treat them as such. Indeed,
the authors flag the concern that a non-rehabilitative response to youth criminal
activity can entrench youths (who may not otherwise tend to life-long criminal-
ity) in a pattern of criminal behaviour as they become isolated from positive
personal influences and external opportunities-such as employment and educa-
tion-that support constructive development.12
However, recognizing the critiques of a purely rehabilitative model, the
authors set out three elements that move their alternative "developmental model"
beyond rehabilitation: proportionality in sentencing, mechanisms to ensure ap-
propriate levels of trial fairness, and restricted judicial discretion in sentencing."
The idea of proportionality-fundamental to adult criminal law-recognizes the.
diminished culpability of youths, but permits adult sentences for more serious
offenders or those who may not have diminished culpability (due to their par-
ticular maturity)." For example, the model favours keeping youths in a rehabili-
tative youth court generally, but recognizes that serious offences involving repeat
offenders may need to be transferred to adult court. At the same time, it avoids
the limitations of binary adult or child categorizations by introducing a more
flexible spectrum that can account for the specific developmental level and cir-
cumstances of individual youths. Proportionality also tends to balance the ele-
ments of rehabilitation and public protection.
Key to the successful defence of their model is an answer to the problem of
youths who may be on a path of repeat offences and serious criminal conduct as
11. Ibid. at 223-25. The truth of this assertion is borne out by both scientific and statistical data
showing a sharp drop in criminal behaviours from age seventeen onwards. Ibid at 53.
12. Ibid. at 256.
13. Ibid. at 247-49.
14. Ibid. at 18-21.
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adults. Scott and Steinberg recognize that a majority of youth crimes are commit-
ted by a small fraction of youths.15 While this ratio supports a rehabilitative
model, the authors' endorsement of rigorous sanctions for exceptional behaviour
validates the model. Indeed, one may question whether they are too pessimistic
about the potential for rehabilitation of the youths whose records appear to
indicate troubling patterns of behaviour, given the undesirable effects that, non-
rehabilitative responses and negative external influences can have at an early age.
However, a balance is largely crafted.
One of the most compelling sections of Rethinking Juvenile Justice is the
challenge to the purported public pressures for "tough on crime" measures for
youths and the deconstruction of the statistics that are rolled out to punish
youths severely in the interests of public safety and deterrence. 6 The authors
persuasively argue that the moral panic that arises following high-profile incidents
distorts public opinion and creates an impression of increasing youth crime when
rates are actually falling. 7 Moreover, they also effectively challenge the method-
ology by which these statistics are generated, reaching the conclusion that the
public is actually more inclined to support less punitive, and more constructive,
dispositions for youths in the interests of fostering the development of responsible
adults.18 Given the existence of a similar inclination to moral panic in other coun-
tries, including Canada, this insight is invaluable.19
15. Ibid. at 252-53. This same trend has been identified in Canada: in a ten year study that
followed youths born in 1987 and 1990, 10 per cent of those studied were involved in 46
per cent of the reported crimes for their cohort. Statistics Canada, "The Development of
Police-Reported Delinquency Among Canadian Youth Born in 1987 and 1990," Cat.
no. 85-561-MIE-No. 009 (2007), by Peter J. Carrington (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for
Justice Statistics, 2007) at 58.
16. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 1, c. 9, 265.
17. Ibid. at 105.
18. Ibid. at 278-82.
19. The classic example of this phenomenon in the Canadian context is the push for increased
penalties under the former YOA, supra note 5, at a time when Canada had one of the highest
rates of youth incarceration in the world. See e.g. Nicholas Bala, Youth Criminal Justice (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2003) at 65ff, 71. A similar analysis emerged in the Canadian literature leading
up to the YCJA, supra note 5. See Jane B. Sprott, "Understanding Public Views of Youth
Crime and the Youth Justice System" (1996) 38 Can. J. Crim. 271. The dichotomy perceived
in popular views about the incidence of youth violence has also been revisited elsewhere. See
Anthony N. Doob, Jane B. Sprott & Cheryl Marie Webster, "Understanding Youth Crime:
The Impact of Law Enforcement Approaches on the Incidence of Violent Crime Involving
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This study thoroughly canvasses legal and psychological perspectives on
youth justice in the United States. Indeed, the psychological perspective is one
that has not been given extensive consideration in the literature. However, one
notable omission is a consideration of the social factors that contribute to how
youths come into conflict with the law. While the authors provide insights into
youth psychology, a consideration of the social context of youth crime is equally
important to a thorough assessment of the elements that need to be incorporated
into an effective youth justice system.2" To understand how youths are impacted
by the justice system, we need to look at the impact of changing community
structures, racism, structural poverty, and, particularly, the different policing
practices across communities on youth behaviour. These factors can distort the
frequency with which youths encounter the justice system and, in turn, how they
respond to it.2
The central question that a Canadian reader may ask about this work is how
the proposals in RethinkingJuvenile Justice are breaking new ground. The answer,
in Canada, is that they are not. The three principles framing the model are those
embraced by the YCJA22 and the insightful appellate jurisprudence that has
developed under it. The premise that a youth criminal justice system provides
long-term protection for the public by addressing the circumstances leading to
the youths' conduct, rehabilitating the youths, and providing meaningful conse-
quences for offences is the defining paradigm for the YCJA. 23 In 2008, the Su-
preme Court went beyond recognizing that young people have a diminished level
of culpability to give this concept constitutional recognition as a principle of
fundamental justice.24 Furthermore, the YCJA clearly restricts the discretion of
Youth and Matters Related to Understanding the Implications of These Findings" in The
Review of the Roots of Youth Violence, vol. 4, by Roy McMurtry & Alvin Curling, co-chairs
(Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 2008) 65.
20. An analysis of these issues is quite common in the Canadian literature, arising largely from
sociological and criminological perspectives. For a representative overview, see Sanjeev
Anand & Nicholas Bala, "Canadian Youth Crime in Context" in Nicholas Bala, ibid., 553.
Recently, Roy McMurtry and Alvin Curling thoroughly explored these issues in Ontario in
their multi-volume report. McMurtry & Curling, ibid.
21. McMurtry & Curling, ibid., vol. 1, c. 4 at 29ff; Doob, Sprott & Webster, supra note 19.
22. YCJA, supra note 5.
23. Ibid., s. 3(1)(a).
24. R. v. D.B., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 61 [D.B.]. Although the Court divided on whether
this principle precluded a reverse onus on youth to remain under the youth sentencing
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youth judges by limiting the factors to be considered-currently excluding
deterrence as an express consideration and restricting the use of custodial sen-
tences.2' The absence of any reference to the Canadian experience, which is
built on the principles advanced by Scott and Steinberg, dilutes the impact of
their model outside the United States. Ironically, in developing our system,
comparative analysis was clearly a benefit to Canadian policy makers,26 and it
continues to be an important element of the literature.27 On the whole, the
process leading .to the introduction of the YCJA exemplifies the type of princi-
pled analysis that Scott and Steinberg advocate as essential to avoid the patch-
work of systems in the United States that the authors describe. Thus, while the
authors implicitly offer affirmation of the Canadian model, they do not move
forward from that point.
However, there is still immense value in this work because it sets out a co-
gent and principled analysis of the necessary elements of a youth justice system
at a time when the YCJA-the mirror image of Scott and Steinberg's model-
is under challenge. While the majority of Canadian courts have remained com-
mitted to the principles of the YCJA, there is clearly an underlying discord,
reflective of the fundamental tension between rehabilitative and punitive re-
sponses with which the authors grapple. This debate is captured by the divide
between the Supreme Court's majority and dissent in D.B.: do we remain com-
mitted to the principles.set out in the YCJA, with its emphasis on rehabilitation
and long-term public safety? Or do we erode those principles in the name of
harsher sanctions, in reaction to a perceived increase in crime, when youths
commit serious crimes?28 Even more clearly, as Canadian legislators look to react
to Canadian moral panic regarding youth crime-especially serious, violent
crime-the possibility of the balance of the YCJA being skewed by less thor-
oughly considered measures has reappeared. This effort was embodied in Bill
regime (as the majority concluded), there was consensus on the conclusion that it was such
a principle.
25. R v. B. WP., R v. B. VN., [2006] 1 S.C.R. 941 at para. 19 [B. WP.]; YCJA, supra note 5 at s. 38.
26. See e.g. Nicholas Bala et al., eds., Juvenile Justice Systems: An International Comparison of
Problems and Solutions (Toronto: Thompson Educational, 2002). See especially Nicholas
Bala & Rebecca Jaremko Bromwich, "Introduction: An International Perspective on Youth
Justice" in Bala etal, 1.
27. Most recently, see Tullio Caputo & Michel Valke, "A Comparative Analysis of Youth
Justice Approaches" in McMurtry & Curling, supra note 19.
28. D.B., supra note 24 at paras. 76, 130-31.
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C-25, which sought a shift from the nuanced collection of sentencing principles
to the blunt club of deterrence and a renewed use of incarceration for youths."
Although proportional sentences-as urged by the authors and the YCJA-will
inevitably have a deterrent value,3" this initiative to promote deterrence as an
objective validates Scott and Steinberg's concern that moral panic can lead to the
advancement of poorly conceived proposals in reaction to the perceived threat of
youth crime in the short-term.
To the extent that Rethinking Juvenile Justice advances a model for a youth
justice system that reflects the primary elements of the YCJA, the book will not
be as radical in its approach to the Canadian reader as it may be to an American
audience. While there are some minor points of departure, the analysis in the
book endorses a system that looks much like the current Canadian model. The
thorough interdisciplinary consideration of many of the principles underlying the
youth justice system is a valuable and accessible resource for anyone -navigating
the legal needs of youths. More importantly, the arguments supporting the "de-
velopmental model," paired with implicit critiques of a more punitive model,
serve as important reminders to legislators seeking to overhaul the YCJA in ways
that will over-emphasize deterrence and move away from the empirically dem-
onstrated, balanced model. The current approach addresses the underlying behav-
iours leading to criminal conduct (with an eye to developing well-adjusted-adults)
and compels youth offenders to accept responsibility for their acts, in proportion
to their developmentally-gauged culpability.
29. Bill C-25, An Act to Amend the Youth Criminal Justice Act, 39th Parl., 2d Sess., 2007 (the bill
did not become law before the 39th Parliament ended on 7 September 2008).
30. B.WP., supra note 25 at paras. 4, 31, 39.

